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Abstract
In a repeated-interaction public goods economy, dynamic behavior may affect the
efficiency of various mechanisms thought to be efficient in one-shot games. Inspired
by results obtained in previous experiments, the current paper proposes a simple best
response model in which players’ beliefs are functions of previous strategy profiles. The
predictions of the model are found to be highly consistent with new experimental data
from five mechanisms with various types of equilibria. Interesting properties of a 2-
parameter Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism help to draw out this result. The simplicity
of the model makes it useful in predicting dynamic stability of other mechanisms.
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1 Introduction
There exists a large number of mechanisms that implement Pareto optimal allocations
in public goods economies. Given the problem of selecting a particular mechanism for
a public goods problem in which the level of the good must be re-evaluated at regular
intervals, one would like to know which mechanisms converge quickly to the equilibrium
outcome and which may cycle or diverge in the repeated setting. Behavioral models are
typically suited for games with finite strategy spaces that are difficult to apply to direct
mechanisms without imposing an arbitrary grid structure on decisions whose coarseness
may significantly affect the dynamics of the model. For predicting convergence in the
current application, a tractable model of behavior in a repeated game settings is more
desirable. In the current paper, five public goods mechanisms with various equilibrium
properties are experimentally tested in a repeated play setting and observed behavior
approximates a simple model in which agents best respond to beliefs formed by the
unweighted average of the previous few periods. In particular, the predictions of this
model provide a significant improvement in accuracy of prediction over the static stage
game equilibrium prediction. This result holds if the mechanism is efficient or inefficient
and if the equilibrium is in dominant strategies or not. Although this simple model
does not perfectly track behavior, it is useful in predicting convergence and therefore
may provide a selection criterion for the mechanism designer interested in implementing
Pareto optimal outcomes in the repeated public goods setting.
Five public goods mechanisms with different equilibrium properties are compared in
an identical laboratory environment. These are the Voluntary Contribution, Proportional
Tax (with voluntary contributions,) Groves-Ledyard, Walker, and cVCG (Vickrey-Clarke
∗The author wishes to thank John Ledyard for financial support, advice, and encouragement in
writing this paper, as well as Ken Binmore, Matt Jackson, Tim Cason, Bob Sherman, Ivana Komunjer,
Peter Bossaerts, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, and David Grether for their valuable suggestions and comments.
†Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA
91125. Email: pj@hss.caltech.edu.
Groves with a continuum of possible public goods levels) mechanisms1. The conclusions
of this paper are as follows. The data in all five mechanisms are consistent with a best
response model in which agents maximize utility given that the belief that the strategy
profile played by other agents in the current period will equal the average strategy profile
over a small number of previous periods. Predictive power of this model is significantly
greater than that of the static stage game equilibrium assumption. Behavior in the
cVCG mechanism converges close to the efficient equilibrium with over half of the sub-
jects choosing truthful revelation and nearly all others playing weakly dominated best
response strategies. The Groves-Ledyard mechanism converges close to equilibrium, as
does the Voluntary Contribution mechanism. The Proportional Tax mechanism does not
systematically converge and the Walker mechanism behavior fails to converge. Further-
more, all strategy profiles observed to be stable or asymptotically stable are ε-equilibrium
strategy profiles. All of these qualitative observations are consistent with the best re-
sponse model. In the current environment, the cVCG mechanism is found to be the
most efficient and stable, while the payoffs in the Walker mechanism are often worse
than that of the initial endowments. The scope of this set of public goods mechanism
experiments is arguably larger than any to date since five mechanisms are compared in
identical environment; see Chen [8] for a survey of previous experiments.
2 Previous Experiments
The following discussion highlights the fact that previous experimental results in public
goods mechanisms appear to be consistent with a best response behavioral model. The
large set of experiments in the current paper tests this hypothesis directly by comparing
behavior across a wide variety of mechanisms.
In the decades since the theoretical development of public goods mechanisms, exper-
imental tests have focused primarily on Nash mechanisms. In particular, the Groves-
Ledyard mechanism has been studied by several authors in repeated one-shot laboratory
tests. Under a sufficiently high punishment parameter, strategies converge rapidly to
equilibrium. Chen and Plott [6] study the effect of this parameter and Chen and Tang [7]
compare the Groves-Ledyard mechanism to the Walker mechanism. The results of these
studies imply that the Groves-Ledyard mechanism significantly outperforms the Walker
mechanism, apparently due to the dynamic instability of the Walker mechanism that is
observed in actual subject behavior as well as in many theoretical models of behavioral
dynamics.
The first well-controlled public goods test of the Pivot mechanism (the VCG mech-
anism with a binary public good) is given by Attiyeh, Franciosi and Isaac [1]. Subjects
are given positive or negative values for a proposed project and must submit a message
1The cVCG mechanism is in contrast to the “Pivot” version of the VCG mechanism in which a binary
public project is either funded or scrapped depending upon the reported valuations of the agents in the
economy.
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indicating their demand for the project. For example, large negative messages represent
strong opposition to the project. Here, around ten percent of observed strategies were
demand-revealing, with thirteen of twenty subjects never revealing their true value. A
regression of bids on values indicates that players with extreme preferences tend to un-
derstate the magnitude of their demand and players with preferences near indifference
tend to overstate their demand.
Kawagoe and Mori [24] extend the Attiyeh et al. result by comparing the above
treatment to one in which subjects are given a payoff table. The effect of having players
choose from the table is significant, as demand revelation increases to 47%. The authors
argue that the weak nature of the dominant strategy prevents all subjects from finding
their equilibrium strategy since non-revelation strategies may also be best responses2.
In an unpublished pilot experiment run by Kawagoe and Mori (“A Short Report on
Pivotal Mechanism Experiment”, Nagoya City University, 1999), the cVCG mechanism
with strictly concave utilities is tested in an environment where subjects first participate
in the mechanism without a detailed payoff table and again with the table. Instead
of submitting their value as in the Pivot mechanism, agents report the intercept of
their marginal valuation curve, which is given to be linear with an identical slope for
all agents. The demand revelation frequencies in this experiment are similar to those
in Pivot mechanism with and without the payoff table, which is particularly surprising
given that a grid of only 11 strategies was imposed on the strategy space. The ten
percent of observations in which subjects reveal their true intercept parameter without a
payoff table is therefore consistent with completely random behavior, possibly indicating
significant confusion among subjects.
Most recently, Cason, Saijo, Sjostrom and Yamato [5] compare the Pivot and cVCG
mechanisms and show that deviations from truthful revelation, when they occur, tend
to result in non-dominant Nash equilibria that are outcome equivalent to the dominant
strategy equilibrium. The Pivot mechanism is as in previous studies, but agents in the
cVCG mechanism are given single-peaked Euclidean preferences and report only their
ideal point. In both sessions, players are given detailed payoff tables and are asked to
choose their strategy from the columns of the table. The underlying public goods prob-
lem and mechanism are not explained to the subjects. The game is played as a two-player
game in rotating, anonymous pairings rather than the typical five-player treatments seen
in the previous studies. Half of the observed pairings play a dominant strategy equilib-
rium in the Pivot mechanism and 81 percent of pairings do so in the cVCG mechanism3.
In the Pivot mechanism, if both subjects randomly deviate from dominant strategies
uniformly across the strategy space then approximately half of the observations would
be Nash equilibria. Since two-thirds of observed non-dominant strategy observations
2Although not mentioned in the paper, the data reveal that 25% of observations have the wrong sign,
where agents with positive values bid against the project or vice versa. This indicates that there may
be confusion among the subjects about the workings of the mechanism.
3By the discreteness of the game, there are actually four dominant strategy equilibria. Since players
are not given the underlying context of the environment, the concept of demand revelation is a bit
ambiguous, so dominant strategy play is considered equivalent to revelation.
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are Nash equilibria, there exists a tendency toward Nash equilibria in the absence of
dominant strategy play.
In this game form, if only one subject plays his dominant strategy while the other
overstates her value, the outcome will be in the interior of a large set of Nash equilibria4.
The good is produced in the dominant strategy equilibrium with the given parameters,
so that one player overstating her value has no affect on the outcome while understating
her value will reduce her payoff. With this insight, the high frequency of non-dominant
Nash equilibrium observations can be explained by deviations of only one player that are
payoff equivalent to the dominant strategy. Behaviorally, this explanation is consistent
with an evolutive model where agents play any payoff maximizing strategy rather than
an eductive model where agents solve for the equilibria of the game.
The results of existing studies imply that dynamically stable Nash equilibria and strict
dominant strategy equilibria are good predictors of behavior in public goods mechanisms
(and perhaps in other similar game forms,) but Nash mechanisms with poor stability
properties in fact produce unstable behavior. Also, payoff-equivalent strategies may
be chosen over a weak dominant strategy equilibrium. These behaviors are consistent
with a best response model in which beliefs are functions of the history of the game. If
beliefs in such a model are consistent with actual play, then the model predicts Nash
equilibrium play. If beliefs in repeated games are simply the strategies observed in
the previous one period, for example, then behavior follows a Cournot best response
dynamic5. In the Walker mechanism, the Nash equilibrium is not an asymptotic attractor
of the one-period best response dynamic6. In the Groves-Ledyard mechanism and the
one-parameter cVCG mechanism with strictly concave utilities, the best response model
converges to the equilibrium prediction. In the Pivot mechanism, the dominant strategy
equilibrium is not asymptotically stable since there always exist strategies that are payoff
equivalent to truthful revelation in any interval containing the truth-telling point. Thus,
the convergence predictions of history-dependent best response models coincide nicely
with the previous experimental results.
3 Setup and Environment
The general environment in use is as follows. A set of N = {1, . . . , n} agents have pref-
erences for consumption of a private good x = (x1, . . . , xn) and a single public good y,
4In the two-dimensional strategy space, the dominant strategy pair is located just inside the corner
of a large rectangular set of strategy pairings that are Nash equilibria.
5The previous literature on dynamics in games is inconclusive about which dynamic model best
describes actual behavior. Boylan and El-Gamal (1993) compare nine experiments statistically and find
that the one-period best response and the fictitious play dynamics each fit better to certain experimental
results, but neither appears to be unequivocally the better model across experiments.
6In simulations based on the parameters used in the current set of experiments, the Nash equilibrium
appears to be a local attractor for best response models that form beliefs over a larger number of previous
periods since the dynamic path converges to a periodic oscillation around the Nash equilibrium. However,
the behavior is oscillatory and does not dampen, so the rest point is not an asymptotic attractor.
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which can be represented by the differentiable function ui (y, xi|θi), where θi ∈ Θi indi-
cates the vector of utility parameters held by agent i ∈ N . The set of all such parameters
is given by Θ ≡ ×ni=1Θi. Preferences are assumed throughout to be quasilinear, so that
ui (xi, y|θi) ≡ vi (y|θi) + xi where vi (y|θ) is strictly concave in y.
A public gods allocation is a (n+ 1)-tuple of the form (y, x1, . . . , xn) where y ≥ 0
is the level of public good produced and xi is the amount of private good consumed by
agent i ∈ N . No public good exists initially, although a technology can be used to build
y units of the public good at a cost of c (y) units of the private good. In the current
study, a constant marginal cost κ is assumed with c (0) = 0, so that c (y) = κy. Given
an initial endowment of the private good ωi, consumption of the private good is given by
xi = ωi−τi for each i, where τi represents a transfer payment paid by agent i. Therefore,
the public goods allocation is equivalently expressed as (y, τ1, . . . τn). Individual budget
constraints are not imposed in the following analysis, so that τi may be larger than ωi.
A vector of transfer payments is feasible if
∑
i∈N τi ≥ κy and budget balanced if the
constraint is met with equality.
A mechanism is given exogenously as a game form, indexed by g, in which agents
use their private information θi to choose a message mg,i from a convex strategy space
Mg,i. The vector of all messages is denoted mg ∈ Mg ≡ ×ni=1Mg,i. When there is no
confusion, the g subscript will be dropped. For a given agent i and a vector of messages
m−i ≡ (m1, . . . ,mi−1,mi+1, . . . ,mn), a best response message for agent i is that which
maximizes i’s utility under the assumption that the other agents send messages m−i.
The set of best responses to m−i in mechanism g is denoted by Bg,i (m−i|θi). Define
Bg (m, θ) ≡ ×ni=1Bg,i (m−i|θi) to be the set of message profiles that are best responses to
the profile m. Any fixed point of the best response profile mapping is a Nash equilibrium
strategy profile of the game. Thus, the Nash equilibrium solution concept selects a set
of equilibrium messages dependent upon the preference parameters θ. The equilibrium
strategies are denoted m∗ (θ) = (m∗1 (θ) , . . . ,m
∗
n (θ)), where
m∗ (θ) ∈ {m′ ∈M |m′ ∈ B (m′, θ)}
Note that this solution concept requires each player’s equilibrium strategy to be a function
of the other players’ types if m∗i varies with θj for j 6= i. If the equilibrium message does
not depend on the types of other agents, the Nash equilibrium is in dominant strategies.
The vector of received messages m in mechanism g maps to a unique outcome of the
form
ηg (m) ≡ (yg (m) , τg (yg (m) ,m, κ))
where yg :Mg → R+ determines the level of the public good chosen and τg : R+ ×Mg ×
R+ → Rn determines the vector of transfer payments of the private good to be paid
by each agent7. The strategy space (inputs) and outcome function (outputs) completely
characterize the mechanism. All mechanisms considered here are feasible and some are
budget balanced.
7Set-valued mechanisms may be defined, but implementation in this context is assumed to require
the selection of a unique outcome.
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The objective of the mechanism designer is to implement a social choice correspon-
dence f : Θ ³ R+ × Rn with certain desirable properties. Let
(
yf (θ) , τ f (θ)
) ∈ f (θ)
represent a particular public goods allocation satisfying the properties for preference
parameters θ. In the public goods environment, the appropriate social choice corre-
spondence for a utilitarian planner picks the set of Pareto optimal allocations given by(
yP (θ) , τP (θ)
)
, where
yP (θ) ∈ argmax
y∈R+
[
n∑
i=1
vi (y|θi)− c (y)
]
and τP (θ) satisfies budget balance. A mechanism g implements f if ηg (m
∗ (θ)) ∈ f (θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ. If f(θ) is the set of Pareto optimal allocations, then a mechanism that
implements it is said to be efficient. If yg (m
∗ (θ)) ∈ yP (θ) and τg (yg (m∗ (θ)) ,m∗ (θ) , κ)
is feasible but not budget balanced, then the mechanism is only outcome-efficient. The
surplus transfer payments in this case are assumed to be wasted and yield no value to
any agent in the economy.
3.1 A Best Response Model of Behavior
When a mechanism is played repeatedly by an unchanging set of agents with time-
invariant preferences, agents may use information obtained in previous periods to im-
prove their payoffs in the current period. If agents are imperfect utility maximizers,
then past payoff information may be useful in selecting more successful strategies in the
current period. Such is the motivation behind various reinforcement learning models.
Alternatively, if agents are capable of utility maximization, but beliefs over the strategy
choices of others are not necessarily consistent with actual behavior in each period, then
previous observations may be used to help form beliefs about the strategies to be played
in the current period.
A history-based best response learning model assumes agents’ beliefs over the strate-
gies of others to be used in the current period t are formed from the previously observed
strategies (history) of the other players from periods 1 through t−1, denotedm1−i through
mt−1−i for a given agent i. Define agent i’s belief about the strategy to be played by agent
j in period t to be ψij
(
m1j , . . . ,m
t−1
j
) ∈Mj, which maps each possible history of agent j
into a unique pure strategy for every j 6= i8. Agent i is then assumed to select a best
response to the belief vector ψi−i
(
m1−i, . . . ,m
t−1
−i
)
. Therefore,
B ◦ ψ : ×ni=1
(×j 6=iM t−1j )×Θ³M
maps histories and utility parameters into actions through beliefs. If ψij is undefined for
some j 6= i, then
Bi (∅|θi) ≡
{
mi ∈Mi|mi ∈ Bi
(
m′−i|θi
)
for some m′ ∈ ×j 6=iMj
}
8This definition excludes probabilistic beliefs over a set of pure strategies, such as those assumed by
fictitious play, for example.
6
so that every strategy that is a best response to some profile m′−i is a best response
to unspecified beliefs. Note that this type of learning model assumes that players are
rational but not consistent. In other words, agents perfectly maximize their utility given
their beliefs, but their beliefs may be inconsistent with the actual choices of the other
agents. This assumption is applicable if preferences are either not common knowledge
(as is often the case in experimental and applied environments) or the preferences of
others are not employed in the individual decision making process. If the consistency
assumption were added, the model would predict Nash equilibrium play in every period.
Without consistency, the dynamic process may or may not converge to a Nash equilibrium
through replication.
A k-period average best response model where M is a bounded convex set in Rn
assumes that in all periods t > k ≥ 1
ψij
({
msj
}t−1
s=1
)
= m¯tj ≡
1
k
t−1∑
s=t−k
msj (1)
for all i, j ∈ N and t > k ∈ N. Thus, agents best respond to the belief that the average
message of the previous k periods will be played in the current period9. Note that
ψij ∈Mj by the convexity of Mj.
Behaviorally, the k-period average model implies that agents best respond to an
estimate of the current trend in the messages of other agents. Here, the estimate of
trend is given by a simple moving average filter. Other low-pass filters may be used
to determine the current trend in m−i, such as exponential smoothing or time-weighted
moving averages. Although these various trend models may produce slightly different
results, the implication of such models is that agents form unique, pure-strategy beliefs
about the decisions of others using previous observations, but these beliefs are not highly
sensitive to short-term fluctuations in the choices of others.
The following propositions and corollaries establish the relationship between the k-
period average best response model and both dominant strategies and Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1 Strategies strictly dominated by a pure strategy are never selected in any
period in a k-period average best response dynamic.
The proof of Proposition 1 is straightforward. The dynamic model does not allow
for completely mixed strategies, and all pure strategies predicted by the model must be
best responses to some pure strategy belief. A resulting corollary is that if a game has a
pure strategy profile that strictly dominates all other pure strategy profiles for all i ∈ N ,
then the given dynamic selects the dominant pure strategy profile in all periods. It is
9Most dynamic models are based on mixed strategy probabilities defined on a finite strategy space
while the best response models suggested in this paper are defined over a continuous strategy space and
use only pure strategies.
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important to note, however, that this dynamic process may allow for weakly dominated
strategies to be selected in any period.
The following propositions and corollaries show that under sufficient continuity, con-
vergence of the dynamic process implies that the limit point is in fact a Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 2 If a strategy is observed in k + 1 consecutive periods of the k-period
average best response dynamic then it is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Assume mt ∈ B (m¯t, θ) where m¯t is given in equation (1) and mt = mt−1 =
. . . = mt−k, so that m¯t = mt−1, which also equals mt. Thus, mt ∈ B (m¯t, θ) implies that
mt ∈ B (mt, θ).
Proposition 2 immediately implies the following important corollary.
Corollary 3 All rest points of the k-period best response dynamic are Nash equilibria.
The following proposition shows that convergence implies that the limit point is a
Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4 If {mt}∞t=1 is a sequence of strategy profiles in M consistent with the
k-period average best response dynamic for all t, if the best response correspondence B is
upper hemi-continuous at a point q ∈M and non-empty on M for all θ ∈ Θ, and if
lim
t→∞
mt = q ∈M
then q is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile
Proof. Ifmt converges to q, then the sequence of averages m¯t also converges to q. By
the upper hemi-continuity of B at q, the fact that {m¯t}∞t=1 converges to q implies that any
convergent sequence in M such that the tth term lies in B (m¯t, θ) for all t must converge
to a point in B (q, θ). Since mt ∈ B (m¯t, θ) for all t by assumption, then {mt}∞t=1 is a
sequence with terms in B (m¯t, θ) that converges to q. Thus, q ∈ B (q, θ).
Corollary 5 If {mt}∞t=1 is a sequence of strategy profiles in M ⊆ Rn consistent with the
k-period average best response dynamic that converges to q ∈ M , if η (m) is continuous
and single-valued for all m ∈ M , and if ui (xi, y|θi) is continuous in xi and y for all
θi ∈ Θi and i ∈ N , then q is a Nash equilibrium strategy profile.
This corollary is a simple application of the Theorem of the Maximum, which guar-
antees that the best response correspondence is upper hemi-continuous and non-empty
under the given conditions.
Corollary 6 If q ∈ M is asymptotically stable according to the k-period average best
response dynamic and B is upper hemi-continuous and non-empty, then q is a Nash
equilibrium strategy profile.
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Asymptotic stability requires that the dynamic path from all initial points in some
neighborhood of q converge to q. By Proposition 4, this is clearly sufficient for q to be
a Nash equilibrium.
The above propositions show that, for the k-period average best response dynamic,
rest points are Nash equilibria, as are asymptotically stable points under upper hemi-
continuity of the best response correspondence. It should be noted that strict Nash
equilibria are not necessarily asymptotically stable.
3.2 Experiment Parameters
The experimental design tests five mechanisms with four sessions per mechanism. In
every session, 5 subjects are grouped together to participate in the mechanism through a
computer interface. Each subject in the group is assigned a unique player type, differing
only by their utility parameters and endowments. Quasilinear preferences are induced
with concave quadratic values for the public good given by vi (y|θi) = −aiy2+ biy and an
initial endowment of the private good, ωi. The vector θi = (ai, bi) and the endowment
ωi are positive for all i ∈ N . The quasilinear, quadratic structure of the preferences
is common knowledge across all subjects, although the vectors of individual coefficients
θi = (ai, bi) and endowment ωi are private information. The chosen player type profile
θ = (θ1, . . . , θ5) and endowments are identical across all periods, sessions and mechanisms.
These values are given in Table 1.
[Table 1 about here.]
The cost function for the production of the public good is chosen to be linear with
c (y) = κy = 100y for every session. As will be shown in the next section, these param-
eters provide distinct predictions between various mechanisms. Given the quasilinear
preferences, the Pareto optimal level of the public good is uniquely solved by
yP (θ) = argmax
y≥0
(
302y − 21y2 − 100y)
= 202/42 = 4.8095
From an experimental design standpoint, a non-focal value for the Pareto optimum is
preferred so that public good levels observed at are near Pareto optimal levels cannot be
alternatively explained by subjects choosing integer strategies, for example.
4 The Mechanisms
The Voluntary Contribution, Proportional Tax, Groves-Ledyard, Walker, and continuous
VCG (“cVCG”) mechanisms are compared in the lab. Each has different equilibrium
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properties in the given environment. In particular, Voluntary Contribution has a strict
dominant strategy on the lower boundary of the message space for four of the five player
types and yields inefficiently low levels of the public good, while the equilibrium of the
Proportional Tax mechanism has one player type contributing an inefficiently high level
of the public good and all others contributing zero. The Groves-Ledyard mechanism is
supermodular for the given punishment parameter while the Walker mechanism is not10.
The cVCG mechanism is especially interesting in this setting since there exists a unique
dominant strategy located on a line of best responses in the two-dimensional strategy
space of each player type on which all strategies are payoff equivalent to the dominant
strategy.
The following is a description of each mechanism in detail. A reader familiar with
the details of public goods mechanisms may skip the discussion of the Voluntary Contri-
bution, Proportional Tax, Groves-Ledyard, and Walker mechanisms, though the cVCG
mechanism in use here has interesting properties that are critical in understanding the
results presented below.
4.1 Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
The Voluntary Contribution mechanism serves as a baseline mechanism because it re-
quires neither communication nor a central authority to collect taxes. The intuition
behind the mechanism is that there exists a technology capable of producing the public
good available to all agents. Given knowledge (or beliefs) about the amount of public
good produced by others, each agent has a free-riding incentive since consumption of the
public good is non-excludable and non-rivalrous. In the setting of the current experi-
ments, four of the five player types have a dominant strategy to contribute nothing since
their marginal value for every unit of the public good is less than its marginal cost.
The mechanism works as follows. Each player i announces mi, the number of units
of the public good to be added to the total. The sum of the contributions represents the
realized level of the public good and the tax paid by agent i is the cost of mi units of the
public good. Mathematically,
y (m) =
n∑
i=1
mi
τi (y (m) ,m, κ) = κmi
The “Robinson Crusoe” ideal point for each agent, denoted y˜i, is the amount of public
good she would contribute in the absence of contributions by others. In the current
environment,
y˜i ≡ bi − 100
2ai
10Muench & Walker (1983) show that maintaining this dynamic stability property of the Groves-
Ledyard mechanism as n → ∞ requires the punishment parameter γ to grow at a rate equal to n.
However, for large n the punishment parameter will become inhibitive.
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The unique best response message is given by
Bi (m−i|θi) = y˜i −
∑
j 6=i
mj
The vector of Robinson Crusoe ideal points for the given parameter values is
y˜ =
(
−33, 1, −15, −22
3
, −7
)
The message space is restricted to M = [0, 6]5 so that the Nash equilibrium is clearly
m∗ (θ) = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0). Since y˜i < 0 for players 1, 3, 4 and 5, zero contribution is a
strict dominant strategy. Player 2’s best response, however, is sensitive to the choices
of others.
4.2 Proportional Tax Mechanism
An alternative to the “pure” Voluntary Contribution mechanism is a voluntary contri-
bution mechanism in which all agents pay an equal share of the production cost. For
example, the central taxing authority can be assumed to entirely reimburse contributing
agents for costs incurred using funds collected from an equal head tax paid by all agents
in the economy. Thus, all agents in the economy pay an equal share of the cost regardless
of their level of contribution, wealth, or benefits received. The formal setup is as follows.
The functions y (m) and τi (m) are given by
y (m) =
∑
i∈N
mi
and
τi (y (m) ,m, κ) =
1
n
κy (m)
The Robinson Crusoe ideal point for each agent is
y˜i ≡ bi − 20
2ai
and the unique best response message is
Bi (m−i|θi) = y˜i −
∑
j 6=i
mj
The vector of Robinson Crusoe ideal points for the given experimental parameters is
y˜ = (7, 6, 5, 4, 3)
The message space is chosen to be identical to the Voluntary Contribution mechanism
message space, where M = [0, 6]5. Note that this message space generates a corner
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equilibrium of m∗ (θ) = (6, 0, 0, 0, 0)11. No agent in this mechanism has a dominant
strategy, although players 3, 4 and 5 are, in some sense, less likely to prefer non-zero
contributions given the ideal points of players 1 and 2.
4.3 Groves-Ledyard Mechanism
This efficient mechanism requires all agents pay an equal share of the cost plus a penalty
term based on deviations from the average of the others’ contributions and on the variance
of those contributions. Formally, the outcome functions are given by
y (m) =
∑
i∈N
mi
and
τi (y (m) ,m, κ) =
κ
n
y (m) +
γ
2
(
n− 1
n
(mi − µi)2 − σ2i
)
where
µi =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
mj
and
σ2i =
1
n− 2
∑
j 6=i
(mj − µi)2
are the mean and sample variance of the n − 1 other agents’ messages. Each agent’s
unique best response message in the quadratic, quasilinear environment is given by
Bi (m−i|θi) = bi − κ/n
2ai + γ
n−1
n
+
(
γ/n− 2ai
2ai + γ
n−1
n
)∑
j 6=i
mj
For the current parameters, the term in parentheses is positive for all player types.
Therefore, the game is supermodular, which is a sufficient condition for the one-period
best response dynamic to converge to the Nash equilibrium12.
The equilibrium of the game is
m∗ (θ) = (1.0057, 1.1524, 0.96952, 0.86476, 0.81714)
which gives yg (m
∗ (θ)) = 4.8095 = yP (θ). The message space used in testing this
mechanism is chosen to be M = [−4, 6]5, which is identical to that used by Chen and
Plott [6] and Chen and Tang [7]. Clearly the Nash equilibrium strategy profile lies within
the interior of the message space.
11If the upper bound of the message space were chosen to be greater than or equal to 7, then the
equilibrium would be m∗ = (7, 0, 0, 0, 0).
12Chen (2000) shows that this mechanism is a supermodular game if and only if γ ≥
−nmini∈N
{
∂2vi/∂y
2
}
, which implies that γ/n ≥ maxi∈N {2ai}. Since maxi∈n {2ai} = 16 and
γ/n = 20, the game is supermodular.
12
The equilibrium vector of taxes has each agent paying approximately 96.18 francs.
The relatively small difference across equilibrium messages serves to reduce the mag-
nitude of the penalty function in equilibrium, thus reducing the variance in taxes. The
equilibrium vector of taxes satisfies individual rationality in the current setting, although
it is well known that this would not be true for all parameter values.
4.4 Walker Mechanism
Walker [45] developed the following “paired difference” mechanism that implements the
Lindahl allocation in Nash equilibrium. The y (m) and τi (m) functions are defined as
y (m) =
∑
i∈N
mi
and
τi (y (m) ,m, κ) =
(κ
n
+mdi
)
y (m)
respectively, where
mdi ≡ m(i−1)modn −m(i+1)modn
The unique best response message is given by
Bi (m−i|θi) = bi − κ/n−m
d
i
2ai
−
∑
j 6=i
mj
Solving for the equilibrium with the given parameters,
m∗ (θ) = (12.276, −1.438, −6.771, −2.200, 2.943)
which gives the Lindahl allocation
(y (m∗ (θ)) , τ (y (m∗ (θ)) ,m∗ (θ) , κ)) =
(4.8095, (117.26, 187.8, 99.855, 49.469, 26.567))
To accommodate the disperse equilibrium messages, the message space is expanded to
M = [−10, 15]5.
Note the similarity between the best resonse function for the Walker mechanism and
those of the Voluntary Contribution and Proportional Tax mechanisms. In all three
specifications, each agent has a particular value of y˜i ≡ Bi (m−i|θi) +
∑
j 6=imj that she
would most prefer. These heterogeneous ideal public good levels create instability in
the simple best response dynamic as each agent attempts to force the public good level
to their own ideal point. The fact that the messages of some other agents are a part
of Bi (m−i|θi) in the Walker mechanism allows for an interior equilibrium, but the off-
equilibrium best response dynamics are still similar to those of the other two mechanisms.
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Chen and Tang [7] also show that the cost of deviating by some fixed ε from the Nash
equilibrium is less in the Walker mechanism than in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism,
particularly as the punishment parameter γ increases. Since the opportunity cost of
choosing a deviating strategy is lower, subjects may be more likely to attempt such
deviations. These observations indicate that the equilibrium of the Walker mechanism is
less attractive and less stable than that of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism.
4.5 Continuous VCG (cVCG) Mechanism
The continuous version of the VCG mechanism with a two-dimensional message space is
particularly interesting in this context because the set of best responses to a given pure
strategy profile is much larger than the unique dominant strategy point. Specifically, all
points on a particular line in the strategy space that intersects the dominant strategy
point are best responses to some m−i. The best response learning model predicts that
subjects play strategies on the best response line while the dominant strategy prediction is
limited to to the truthful revelation point. Given that the dominant strategy equilibrium
is a zero-dimensional space, the best response set is one-dimensional for each agent, and
the strategy space is two-dimensional, it is possible to distinguish between equilibrium,
best response, and random (or, unexplained) strategy choices.
The cVCG mechanism studied is identical to the mechanism used in the pilot exper-
iment of Kawagoe and Mori. The message space is set equal to the parameter space, so
that
Mi = Θi
and a message mi can be equivalently expressed as an announced parameter value θˆi =
(aˆi, bˆi). The outcome function takes the vector of announced parameter values θˆ and
solves for the Pareto optimal level of y on the assumption that θˆ is the true vector of
preference parameters. Formally,
y(θˆ) = argmax
y
[
n∑
i=1
vi(y|θˆ)− κ y
]
=
∑n
i=1 bˆi − κ
2
∑n
i=1 aˆi
The tax function is given by
τi(y(θˆ), θˆ, κ) =
κ
n
y(θˆ)−
(∑
j 6=i
vj(y(θˆ)|θˆj)− n− 1
n
κ y(θˆ))
)
+
(∑
j 6=i
vj(zi(θˆ−i)|θˆj)− n− 1
n
κ zi(θˆ−i))
)
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where
zi(θˆ−i) ≡ argmax
y
∑
j 6=i
vj(y|θˆj)− n− 1
n
κy
=
∑
j 6=i bˆj − n−1n κ
2
∑
j 6=i aˆj
represents the Pareto optimal level of the good for the n − 1 agents excluding i and
assuming the preference parameters θˆ−i were announced truthfully.
The first-order condition for utility maximization by agent i given the announcements
θˆ−i is
dui
dθˆi
=
dy
dθˆi
([
bi +
∑
j 6=i
bˆj − κ
]
− y(θˆ)
[
2
(
ai +
∑
j 6=i
aˆj
)])
.
Since dy/dθˆj 6= 0 for all θˆi ∈ Θi and all i ∈ N due to linearity in the bˆi parameter,
utility maximization is necessarily achieved by setting the term in parentheses to zero
through manipulation of y(θˆ). The necessary and sufficient condition for maximization
is therefore
y(θˆi, θˆ−i) =
bi +
∑
j 6=i bˆj − κ
2
(
ai +
∑
j 6=i aˆj
) = y(θi, θˆ−i).
Thus, any announcement by player i that results in the same level of the public good
as would have obtained under truth-telling is necessarily a best response. Since truth-
telling is a best response given any θˆ−i, then it is a weakly undominated strategy. Solving
explicitly for the set of individual best responses to any set of reports θˆ−i = (aˆ−i, bˆ−i)
gives
Bi
(
θˆ−i|θi
)
=

(aˆBi , bˆ
B
i ) ∈ Θi : bˆBi = aˆBi
(∑
j 6=i bˆj+bi−κ∑
j 6=i aˆj+ai
)
+
(
bi
∑
j 6=i aˆj−ai
∑
j 6=i bˆj+aiκ∑
j 6=i aˆj+ai
)
 . (2)
Since a strategy θˆi affects agent i’s utility only through the value of y(θˆi, θˆ−i), indifference
curves in agent i’s strategy space correspond to level curves of the y(·, θˆ−i) function. The
set Bi(θˆ−i|θi) is therefore the level set of i’s most preferred quantity of the public good
given θˆ−i. With quadratic, quasilinear utilities, the level curves of y(·, θˆ−i) are the
parallel lines through the strategy space given by Equation 2. The slope and intercept
of the most-preferred contour line varies with θˆ−i, but the fact that θi is a point in the
line does not. Thus, the line Bi(θˆ−i|θi) rotates about θi as θˆ−i changes. See Figure 1 for
a simple illustration of these sets.
[Figure 1 about here.]
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It is important to reiterate the fact that the set of Nash equilibria extends beyond the
unique dominant strategy equilibrium. As a simple example, if n− 1 agents fully reveal
their preference parameters while the nth agent announces θˆn ∈ Bn (θ−n|θn) \ {θn}, then
a weakly dominated Nash equilibrium has obtained. Since y(θˆn, θ−n) = y (θ) = yP (θ),
this equilibrium is also outcome efficient.
Although this mechanism is known to be inefficient due to its lack of budget balance,
the size of the predicted efficiency varies with the parameter choices. Thus, the results
obtained in the laboratory are sensitive to the choice of preference parameters. The
parameters in use for the current set of experiments generate equilibrium efficiencies of
over 99%. The discussion in Section 6.4 will highlight the significance of this (or any)
fixed parameter choice in analyzing the results.
5 Experimental Design
All experiments were run at the California Institute of Technology using undergraduates
recruited via e-mail. Most subjects had participated in economics experiments, though
none had experience with the particular game forms in the current study. Four sessions
were run with each mechanism for a total of twenty sessions13. In each session, from five
to twenty subjects were simultaneously brought into the laboratory. Instructions were
given to the subjects and read aloud by the experimenter14. Subjects were then given
their private information (preference parameters and initial endowments) on a slip of
paper. All subjects logged into the game from their computer terminal. Each subject
knew she was grouped with four others, but could not discern which individuals were in
her group15. The use of the software was explained in detail to the subjects, although no
practice rounds were played.
The software interface includes two useful tools for the subjects to use at any time.
First, a history window is available that displays the results of all past periods. Subjects
can see all previous outcomes, including the message they sent, taxes paid, public good
levels, and profits. The entire vector of messages submitted by the other agents in
previous periods is not shown; only the relevant variables used in calculating their tax,
value and payoff functions are provided. The second tool, called the “What-If Scenario
Analyzer,” allows subjects to enter hypothetical messages into a calculator-like program
to view what levels of y (m), τi (y (m) ,m, κ) and profit would result. Each subject is
shown only her own hypothetical tax, value, and profits so that subjects can not deduce
the preference parameters of other subjects.
13Four additional sessions with the cVCG mechanism were run, but had to be discarded due to
a software glitch. These data are very similar to the reported sessions and feature a slightly higher
frequency of demand revelation.
14Instructions and copies of the software are available upon request.
15In one cVCG session, only one group of subjects was in the laboratory at the same time. The
subjects were well separated to prevent communication or other out-of-experiment effects.
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The benefit of the “What-If Scenario Analyzer” is that it enables subjects to perform
searches over the strategy space before selecting their strategies. In this sense, it is
similar to giving subjects a payoff table describing all possible outcomes, although the
current tool provides more feedback than payoffs alone. The interest of the current
study is in understanding the learning dynamics involved as subjects repeatedly interact
with each other rather than the dynamics involved in learning how strategies map to
outcomes. Out-of-game experimentation allows subjects to understand how strategies
map to outcomes before making decisions. Instead of a practice period, subjects were
given five minutes to experiment with the “What-If Scenario Analyzer” and ask questions.
During the actual game, subjects enter their message (twice for confirmation) into the
computer. The feedback at the end of each period is identical to the feedback described
above for the history window. Total earnings are kept at the bottom of the screen, along
with the current period number and the total number of periods in the game. Sessions
typically lasted 90 minutes to two hours and subjects were paid a $5 show-up fee plus
earnings that averaged approximately $20 per person.
6 Results
Due to the substantial difference between the structure of the first four mechanisms
and that of the cVCG mechanism, results pertaining to the latter will be considered
seperately.
6.1 Best Response in non-VCG Mechanisms
The predictions of any best response model depend on the beliefs held by the agents
regarding the strategies to be chosen by the other agents. In an anonymous environ-
ment where preference parameters are private information, a reasonable assumption is
that agents’ beliefs depend only on observable histories. A k-period best response model
is consequently one natural candidate for describing subject behavior in such an envi-
ronment. Given that each of the public goods mechanisms under consideration was
developed under the assumption that agents play Nash equilibrium strategies, the static
Nash equilibrium m∗ (θ) serves as an appropriate model against which the best resopnse
models may be tested. If the best response models are found to provide significant
improvement in predicitive power over the Nash equilibrium assumption, then mecha-
nism design theory is improved in accuracy by instead assuming that agents are best
responding to history-dependent beliefs.
6.1.1 Choosing The Parameter k
Using the observed data, best response model predictions for each period t > k are
generated for k ∈ {1, . . . , 10} and compared to the observed announcement in period t.
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The first k periods are required to “seed” the initial beliefs used in the best response
models and are therefore excluded from analysis. To focus further analysis of the best
response models, the value of k that minimizes the average minimum deviation between
the best resopnse set and the data is selected from k ∈ {1, . . . , 10}. Define k∗ to be the
parameter that satisfies
k∗ = arg min
k∈{1,...,10}
[
1
100 (51− tmin)
5∑
g=1
4∑
s=1
5∑
i=1
50∑
t=tmin
(
inf
mB∈Bg,i(m¯tg,s,−i|θi)
∥∥mtg,s,i −mB∥∥
)]
where g ∈ {1, . . . , 5} represents each of the five mechanisms under consideration, s ∈
{1, . . . , 4} indexes the 4 identical sessions of each mechanism, and ‖·‖ is the standard
Euclidean norm. Since the first k periods of each model are used to seed the initial beliefs,
they must be excluded from analysis. Consequently, tmin must be strictly larger than
k. In four of the five mechanisms, Bg,i(m¯
t
g,s,−i|θi) is unique and Mg,i ∈ R1, so the term
in parentheses reduces to a simple absolute difference. In the cVCG mechanism, this
term represents the orthogonal distance from the observed message to the appropriate
best response line.
Table 2 reports the average minimum deviation measure for various values of k and
tmin. Note that for every value of k considered, the deviation measure is strictly decreas-
ing in tmin, indicating that the models are less accurate in early periods than in later
periods. Therefore, comparisons between models should only be made for fixed values
of tmin.
Given that messages are serially dependant and the nature of this dependence is
unknown, no appropriate notion of significance is applicable to this analysis16. The
objective of this subsection is to make further analysis tractable by selecting a single
value k∗ to represent the class of k-period best response models. Therefore, statistical
significance of the difference in quality of fit between best response models is unimportant
in this context; choosing the minimum-deviation model is sufficient.
[Table 2 about here.]
Result 7 Among the k-period best response models with k ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, the 5-period
best response model is estimated to be the most accurate.
Support. The result follows immediately from inspection of Table 2, where the values
of the deviation measure appear to be U-shaped in k for each fixed value of tmin. With one
minor exception (at tmin = 7,) k = 5 is the minimum value for every tmin ∈ {6, . . . , 11} ,
16Serial dependence is clear from inspection of correlograms. Several models of serial dependence
were estimated, including various time trend regressions, GARCH models, and a variety of stochastic
differential equations. None of these procedures was able to adequately explain the data and result in
an apparently uncorrelated error structure.
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and the values are strictly decreasing in k for all tmin ∈ {2, . . . , 5} where the k = 5 model
deviations cannot be calculated.
Given that k∗ = 5, empirical analysis of the best response models will henceforth be
limited to the 5-period model17.
6.1.2 Comparison of Best Response and Equilibrium Models
It is important to note that while the results of this paper examine the properties of best
response behavior, the data may be consistent with a variety of other learning models
as well. The best response model is chosen because it is consistent with qualitative
descriptions of behavior in a variety of mechanisms and it provides a straightforward and
tractable explanation of the experimental results, both past and present. By selecting
a model that improves the accuracy of prediction over that of Nash equilibrium, the
accuracy of mechanism design may be improved.
The relevant question for theoretical mechanism design is whether this dynamic model
represents a significant improvement in accuracy over the equilibrium assumption com-
monly employed. The power of the statistical analysis of this comparison is dependent
upon the degree of separation between the predictions of the two models. Visual inspec-
tion of the data (see Tables 2 through 5) indicates that all player types in the Groves-
Ledyard mechanism, four of five player types in the Voluntary Contribution mechanism
and two player types in the Proportional Tax mechansim converge quickly to equilibrium
(as do their best responses,) resulting in little to no power in comparing the accuracy of
the two models. However, the Walker mechanism data fail to converge to equilibrium
and therefore provide the most powerful tests.
A one-sample runs test for randomness indicates that the errors of both the best re-
sponse and equilibrium models are not randomly drawn from a zero-median distribution
and tests for correlation indicate the errors are serially dependant18. This nonstation-
arity implies that statistics aggregated across time may be easily misinterpreted19. For
example, the average prediction error across all periods does not estimate the average
prediction error in any one period. Since this average is likely a function of the total
17Complete analysis was performed on all models in k ∈ {1, . . . , 10}, and results for k ≥ 2 are similar
to the case of k = 5. As is apparent from Table 2, the k = 1 model is notably less accurate than the
others. The level of variation in the predictions of the k = 1 model is often greater than that of the
data, so the smoothing achieved by the k ≥ 2 models provides a better fit.
18The runs test indicated that the best resopnse model errors for 16 of the 20 total player types were
not evenly scattered about zero at a significance level of 5%. Each of the 4 player types with model errors
apparently randomly drawn from a zero-median distribution were from different mechanisms, indicating
that the assumption of mean-zero random errors for all player types in any one mechanism is invalid.
The errors of the equilibrium model were not evenly scattered about zero for 19 of 20 player types at
the 5% significance level. Tests of first-order correlation indicate that the errors are serially correlated
for all 20 player types in both models.
19The dependence also implies that neither model fully captures the true dynamics of subject behavior
in repeated games.
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number of periods, analysis of the statistic must be considered specific to the length of
the experiment20. Empirical analysis of model fit is therefore performed on each player
type in each period individually, with data aggregated only across the four sessions of
each mechanism. However, the results of the period-by-period statistics may not be
aggregated across time.
[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Figure 5 about here.]
The prediction error of each model, averaged across the four sessions, is presented in
Figures 2 through 5. The confidence intervals are 95% confidence intervals generated by
the bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping method using 2,000 draws in each period
for each player type in each mechanism (see Efron & Tibshirani [13].) These graphs begin
to illustrate the superiority of the best response model over the Nash equilibrium model.
While the two predictions are often very similar, there are certain player types for whom
the equilibrium model systematically under- or over-predicts the observed strategies. The
best response model appears both more accurate and more precise than the equilibrium
model whenever differences between the two are observed.
The statistical hypothesis of interest is whether or not the expected equilibrium model
error is significantly greater than the expected 5-period best response model error. In
the context of non-cVCG mechanisms, error is simply the absolute distance between the
observed message and the unique model prediction. A non-parametric permutation test
for a difference in means between the two model errors is performed in each period for
each player type in each mechanism (Efron & Tibshirani [13].) Each test was based on
an simulated distribution of 2,000 draws, more than enough to make insignificant the
variation in estimated p-values due to random sampling.
The null and alternative hypotheses for each player type i and period t > k are
H0 : E
[∣∣mti −m∗i (θ)∣∣] = E [∣∣mti −Bi (m¯t−i|θi)∣∣] (3)
HA : E
[∣∣mti −m∗i (θ)∣∣] > E [∣∣mti −Bi (m¯t−i|θi)∣∣]
20This is a point occassionally forgotten in past analyses of time series data in experiments, leading
to results that likely depend on the somewhat arbitrary choice of experiment length.
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where the expectation is taken across the four sessions of each mechanism. Clearly, the
power of this test depends on this difference between the predictions of the two models.
If the best response is very near the equilibrium prediction in a given period, the test will
have little power in differentiating the hypotheses and will often fail to reject H0 even
when HA is true. The posterior probability of the truth of HA is consequently a function
of the test’s power. Using the standard significance level of 5% and assuming equal prior
beliefs on the truth of H0 and HA, if the test fails to reject the null hypothesis, a power
of 89.4% is needed to guarantee that the posterior probability on HA is less than 10%.
If the test rejects H0, a power of 45% is needed to ensure that the posterior probability
of HA is greater than 90%
21.
The decision problem is to determine whether or not HA is accurate. Given that a
power level of 45% is needed to provide at least a 90% probability that H0 is false when
the test rejects H0, tests with less than 45% power may be considered indeterminate
in the sense that insufficient information about the truth of HA is provided by the test
result. Tests that do not have sufficient power are therefore excluded from analysis of
the current hypotheses.
To estimate the test’s power as a function of the prediction differences, a simulation of
the permutation test is performed for various differences between the model predictions.
Specifically, four independent, normally distributed random messages (w1, . . . , w4) are
generated with mean µa and variance σ
2
w. This is repeated 100 times and the permutation
test is performed in each repetition on the hypotheses
H˜0 : E [|w − µb|] = E [|w − µa|]
H˜A : E [|w − µb|] > E [|w − µa|]
where µa and µb represent unequal predictions of two different models, the first of which
is correct in the sense that it predicts the true mean of the data. Given that the null
hypothesis is false by construction, an estimate of the power of the permutation test is
given by the percentage of simulated tests that correctly reject H˜0. The simulation is
repeated for various values of (µa − µb) and σw. The estimated power of the test is then
plotted as a function of (µa − µb) /σw, the number of standard deviations separating the
two predictions22. The resulting graph is shown in Figure 6. From this graph, it is clear
21By Bayes’s Rule,
P [HA true|reject H0] =
P [reject H0|HA true]P [HA true]
P [reject H0|HA true]P [HA true] + P [reject H0|HA false]P [HA false]
.
Under diffuse priors, P [HA false] = P [HA true], so
P [HA true|reject H0] =
P [reject H0|HA true]
P [reject H0|HA true] + P [reject H0|HA false]
=
Power
Power + Significance
.
Choosing a standard significance level of 0.05 implies that a test power of 0.45 is necessary to ensure
that P [HA true|reject H0] is greater than 90%. A similar calcuation shows that a power of 0.8944 is
needed to ensure P
[
HA true|don′t reject H0
]
< 10%.
22It should be noted that if the mean of the data were µw > µa > µb, then the test would have even
21
that the distance between the two predictions should be at least 1.75 standard deviations
of the data in order to keep the probability of incorrect rejections of H0 under 10%.
[Figure 6 about here.]
Figures 7 through 10 display the p-value of the permutation test for each player type
in each period, along with the estimated power of each test (drawn from Figure 6) and,
for those tests with power greater than 45%, whether or not the test rejects the null
hypothesis at the 5% and 10% significance levels.
[Figure 7 about here.]
[Figure 8 about here.]
[Figure 9 about here.]
[Figure 10 about here.]
Result 8 The 5-period best response model is overall a better model to explain individual
choice than the Nash equilibrium model.
Support. In the Voluntary Contribution mechanism (Figure 7,) players 1, 3, 4, and
5 have a strict dominant strategy to contribute zero, implying that equilibrium is always
a best response to any beliefs. Since the two models are identical, the power of the
test is zero for these player types. Although the p-values for player 2 never indicate a
rejection of of the null hypothesis, the power of the test is always below 40%, rendering
its conclusions ambiguous.
In the Proportional Tax mechanism (Figure 8,) players 3, 4, and 5 have little incentive
to contribute regardless of the contributions of others, so that the free-riding equilibrium
strategy is most often a best response. Player 1 is expected to contribute 6 units in
equilibrium, and player 2 has an incentive to contribute if player 1 sends less than 6. For
these players, best response is occasionally far from equilibrium, providing enough power
for the permutation tests to be conclusive. For player 1, all 16 tests with sufficient power
more power, while if µa > µw > (µa + µw) /2, the test would have less power.
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reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level, and 15 of 16 reject at the 5% level. Player
2’s results are similar, although the data revert toward equilibrium in the final periods
(see Figure 3 as well.)
The rapid convergence of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism (Figure 9) to equilibrium,
which is accompanied by the convergence of best response predictions to equilibrium,
reduces the power of the test in most periods. The ten tests with sufficient power (out
of 175 possible) do favor the Nash equilibrium model, though the test power being well
below 89.4% in all ten tests prevents conclusive rejection of HA.
Among non-cVCG mechanisms, the Walker mechanism (Figure 10) provides the most
testing power due to the lack of convergence of the data. Players 3 and 5 diverge from
equilibrium frequently, providing many tests with sufficient power. Of the 41 tests due
to player 3, only 2 fail to reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level, while 37 tests reject
H0 at the 5% level. Of the 37 tests due to player 5, 8 fail to reject H0, 12 reject H0 at
the 10% level, and the remaining 17 tests reject H0 at the 5% level. The p-values of all
37 tests are below 0.20. These rejections are scattered evenly throughout the session,
indicating no particular pattern over time. Of the other 3 player types, players 1 and
2 have low p-values on average, with five rejections of H0 and only 1 failure to reject.
Player 4 shows mixed support overall, and in the few tests with sufficient power, shows
fairly strong support for equilibrium behavior. This can also be seen in Figure 5, where
the best response model errors are consistently positive while the average equilibrium
model errors converge to zero.
The significance of this result lies in its implications for implementation in a repeated
interaction setting, where the assumption that agents play Nash equilibrium is clearly less
accurate than a simple best response behavioral assumption. Mechanisms constructed
under the assuption of equilibrium behavior may fail to implement the desired outcome
due to instability in the behavioral process. Although the best response behavioral model
does not provide a complete description of human behavior, a mechanism designer who
assumes this simple dynamic will be able to more accurately implement the desired
outcomes than a designer who assumes equilibrium behavior.
6.2 Best Response in the cVCG Mechanism
In the cVCG mechanism, a belief over the strategy profiles to be played by others induces
a best response surface in the strategy space on which all actions are payoff-equivalent if
the belief is consistent with actual behavior. If the belief puts all probability on a single
strategy profile, the best response manifold in the quasi-linear environment is a line
through the strategy space of the agent that necessarily intersects the truthful revelation
point. The slope and intercept of this line are functions of the anticipated strategies
used by others. If beliefs place nonzero probabilities on multiple strategy profiles, then
the best response surface collapses to the truthful revelation point. In the k-period best
response model, agents are assumed to form beliefs that put all weight on a single pure
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strategy profile, so that the model predicts behavior anywhere on a line through the
strategy space for each agent. As new data are received and the belief updates, this best
response line rotates about the truthful revelation strategy.
Empirically, the decisions of subjects can be grouped into three categories; full rev-
elation of both parameters (which is the weak dominant strategy equilibrium,) partial
revelation of only one parameter, and no revelation. The hypothesis of the best response
model is that those observations in the second and third categories are located along the
appropriate best response line.
6.2.1 Frequency of Revelation
One implication of best response behavior is the possibility of observing weakly dominated
strategies. The following results show that while a majority of observations are consistent
with the dominant strategy equilibrium, a significant number of observations are not.
These observations are shown to instead follow a pattern of weakly dominated best
responses that are payoff equivalent to the truth-telling equilibrium.
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the frequency of parameter revelation observed in the
cVCG mechanism for each player type. Although subjects may enter any non-negative
real number for their strategies, the following analysis is limited to only those strategies
that exactly correspond to parameter revelation – slight deviations from revelation are
excluded.
Result 9 Truthful revelation in the cVCG mechanism is observed with relatively high
frequency. This frequency increases in the final periods.
Support. Refer to Tables 3 and 4. On average, 54% of all observed messages are
full revelation strategies, with the frequency increasing to 59% in the final 10 periods.
Average partial revelation rises to 72% over the last 10 periods. Examining the individual
frequencies over the final 10 periods, half of the twenty subjects fully reveal in at least
nine of the last ten periods. Twelve subjects at least partially reveal in nine of the last
ten periods. Only three subjects fail to fully reveal in all 50 periods, and an additional
three subjects reveal fully only twice. Every subject reveals partially at least twice over
the course of the experiment.
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Interestingly, the frequencies with which players reveal their slope parameter bi is
within 2% of the frequency of partial revelation when averaged across all subjects. In
other words, when a subject partially reveals but does not fully reveal, it is most often
the intercept parameter that is misrepresented. This is likely due to the fact that the
intercept parameter has a linear effect on payoffs, unlike the slope parameter, so that
experimentation with the intercept announcement may be more intuitive than with the
slope announcement.
6.2.2 Patterns of Misrevelation & Weakly Dominated Best Responses
Although more than half of the cVCG decisions are full revelation strategies, a fair
number of off-equilibrium observations remain to demonstrate that the data concentrate
around the best response surfaces induced by the beliefs of the 5-period best response
model. Full revelation strategies are necessarily best responses consistent with this
model. Partial revelation and no-revelation strategies are off-equilibrium behavior that
may or may not be consistent with best response.
A convenient method for analyzing the data in this mechanism is to convert the two-
dimensional messages (aˆti, bˆ
t
i) into polar coordinates (φˆ
t
i, rˆ
t
i) with the origin at the truthful
revelation point (ai, bi). Specifically, define the polar coordinates to be
φˆti ≡

∅ if aˆti = ai & bˆti = bi
pi/2 if aˆti = ai & bˆ
t
i > bi
−pi/2 if aˆti = ai & bˆti < bi
arctan
(
bˆsi−bi
aˆsi−ai
)
otherwise
rˆti ≡
√
(aˆti − ai)2 +
(
bˆti − bi
)2
From Equation (2), the best response angle is given by
φBi
(
θ¯−i|θi
)
=
{
pi/2 if
∑
j 6=i a¯j + ai = 0
arctan
(∑
j 6=i b¯j+bi−κ∑
j 6=i a¯j+ai
)
otherwise
.
The since the best response prediction allows for any rˆti , the prediction error can be
measured as the difference between the observed angle of the data and the best response
angle. If the non-dominant strategy observations are best responses, φˆti − φBi
(
θ¯−i|θi
)
will be zero. Figure 11 displays the observed data in polar form with the origin located
at the truth-telling point and the zero-degree line corresponding to the 5-period best
response prediction. The equilibrium model predicts that all data will be located at
the center of this graph, while the best response model predicts that all data will be
scattered along the horizontal axis. Figure 12 shows the time-series representations of rˆti
and φˆti − φBi
(
θ¯−i|θi
)
for each player type in the cVCG mechanism. The 95% confidence
intervals are again formed by the bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrapping method
with 2,000 draws. Note that all equilibrium observations are excluded from the graph
of φˆti − φBi
(
θ¯−i|θi
)
, futher reducing the usable sample size.
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[Figure 11 about here.]
[Figure 12 about here.]
Result 10 The 5-period best response prediction appears to be an accurate prediction of
non-equilibrium play.
Support. Given the dependence of messages across periods, statistical tests must
be performed on a period-by-period basis. However, the removal of all full-revelation
observations reduces the average sample size to less than two observations per period –
not enough for statistical testing. Figure 11 clearly shows that the data scatter along
the best response prediction. In the left graph, three data points are located over 900
units from the truth-telling equilibrium but lie within 1.09 degrees of the best response
prediction. In total, half of all non-equilibrium observations are within 1.295 degrees of
the best response line and 81.4% are within 10 degrees of the prediction. This analysis
includes all partial revelation observations for which φˆti is necessarily a multiple of pi/2.
After removing these observations, just over half of the remaining data are within 0.832
degrees of the best response prediction, and 79.3% are within 10 degrees.
Figure 12 tells a similar story. The average distance from the truth-telling equilibrium
is frequently large, highly variable, and does not converge toward zero for three of the five
player types. The high frequency of full and partial revelation drives the lower bounds
of the confidence intervals toward zero in most instances. The graphs of φˆti − φBi (θ¯−i|θi)
across time show that the off-equilibrium data are centered at or near the best response
prediction, with indications of convergence over time. Again, small sample sizes prevent
clean statistical analyses.
The tendancy for the angular deviation to be slightly positive by about 6 degrees,
which is visible in both figures, arises from the partial revelation observations. 86.9% of
the best response lines are between 83◦ and 85◦ while 20% of all off-equilibrium observa-
tions are partial revelation strategies located at 90◦.
6.3 Testing Theoretical Properties of the Best Response Model
In Section 3, various theoretical properties of the k-period average best response model
are derived. Each of these may be tested empirically to confirm that the important
implications of this behavioral assumption are observed in the laboratory.
In the cVCG mechanism, if four players fully reveal and the fifth chooses a non-
revelation strategy on Bi(θ−i|θi), the result is a Nash equilibrium with one player choosing
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a weakly dominanted strategy. Given that B5(θ−5|θ5) is a sloped line through R2,
choosing a strategy exactly on the best response line is a stringent requirement. However,
if θˆ5 is sufficiently near B5(θ−5|θ5), then u5(η (θ) |θ5)− u5(η(θˆ5, θ−5)|θ5) will be less than
some ε > 0. In other words, (θˆ5, θ−5) will be an ε-equilibrium. Since θˆ5 is weakly
dominated by θ5, (θˆ5, θ−5) is called a weakly dominated ε-Nash equilibrium.
Result 11 Weakly dominated ε-Nash equilibria are observed, while undominated equilib-
ria are not.
Support. Setting ε = 1, 30.5% of observed strategy profiles in the cVCG mechanism
are weakly dominated ε-Nash equilibria. At ε = 5, 67% of the profiles are ε-equilibria.
Across the last 12 periods, ε-equilibria are observed 93.8% of the time for ε = 5. In the
first session, subjects play a particular ε-equilibrium (for ε ≥ 1/2) in each of the final
19 periods. In none of the 200 repetitions of the cVCG mechanism is the truth-telling
dominant strategy equilibrium observed.
Beyond providing further support for a best response model of behavior, this result
has greater implications: it suggests that elimination of weakly dominated strategies
leads to the elimination of certain Nash equilibria that are observed in the laboratory.
The practice of iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies is consequently in-
appropriate as an equilibrium selection algorithm. The following result indicates that
elimination of strictly dominated strategies is consistent with observed behavior.
[Figure 13 about here.]
Result 12 (Proposition 1) Messages quickly converge to and do not significantly deviate
from strictly dominant strategies in any period t > 5.
Support. See Figure 13 for a graph of the average strategy chosen among players in
the Voluntary Contribution mechanism with a strict dominant strategy to send mti = 0
in every period23. Since the confidence intervals are generated by the bias-corrected
bootstrapping method (with 2,000 draws for each period,) zero cannot lie in the interior
of any confidence interval when all of the data are non-negative. After the 16th period,
the upper bound of the confidence interval remains below 0.5 and drops below 0.2 after
the 36th period. In the final four periods, the upper bound of the confidence interval
drops to as low as 0.005 and the lower bound is identically zero. Overall, 64.25% of the
observations are exactly zero.
The following results indicate that convergence and repetition of observed messages
are often indicative of a Nash equilibrium, which is also a property of the best response
model of behavior.
23This is the only mechanism with strict dominant strategies since the equilibrium of the cVCG
mechanism is in weak dominant strategies.
27
Result 13 (Proposition 2) If a strategy is observed in 6 consecutive periods, then it is
most likely a Nash equilibrium strategy.
Support. In the non-cVCG mechanisms, there are 754 messages mti such that m
t
i =
mt−1i = · · · = mt−5i . Of those, 74.8% are Nash equilibrium messages. 80. 1% of such
messages are within 1 unit of Nash equilibrium. In the cVCG mechanism, 45% of the
375 such messages are ε-equilibria with ε = 1. Setting ε = 5 increases the frequency to
82.1%.
Result 14 (Proposition 4) If a sequence of strategy profiles converges to a point q, then
q is most likely a Nash equilibrium strategy profile.
Support. Of the 20 groups across the 5 mechanisms, only one played the same
strategy profile in all of the last 10 periods, indicating convergence to a particular strategy
profile. As noted in Result 11, the first session of the cVCG mechanism converged to
an ε-equilibrium (ε = 1/2) in all of the final 19 periods. One group in the Proportional
Tax mechanism played a particular non-equilibrium strategy in 15 of the final 25 periods
while another group played the Nash equilibrium profile in 7 of the final 10 periods.
Overall, the above results indicate that the dynamic properties of observed behavior
are roughly in line with the theoretical properties of the k-period best response dynamic.
6.4 Efficiency & Public Good Levels
The ability to compare data across a fairly large number of mechanisms leads to the
natural question of which mechanisms generate the most efficient outcomes. In fact,
this study provides a unique opportunity to do so since no other experiment to date
has tested as many processes side-by-side. Although outcomes and efficiencies can be
compared, it should be understood that results may be very sensitive to changes in
parameters. In particular, the current set of parameters yields high efficiency levels in
the cVCG mechanism24. It is probable that the realized efficiency of this mechanism
would be reduced given parameters with much lower equilibrium efficiency. In fact, it
may be true that behavior changes in a low efficiency environment as subjects face a
more stark contrast between incentives and efficiency25. Furthermore, the dependence of
messages across time limits statistical comparison to a period-by-period analysis with no
measure of overall significance. The average public good level and realized efficiency are
presented in Figure 14 along with 95% bootstrap confidence intervals.
[Figure 14 about here.]
24A test of equilibrium efficiencies in a random sample of “similar” parameters found the current
parameters to yield efficiencies in the top 5% of the distribution.
25Thanks to John Ledyard for this suggestion.
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Result 15 For the given parameters, the average public good levels are closest to the
Pareto optimal level in the cVCG mechanism, followed by the Groves-Ledyard mechanism.
Efficiency in the other three mechanisms is lower, with the Walker mechanism often
resulting in efficiency below that of the initial endowment.
Support. Figure 14 shows the average public good levels in each period of each
mechanism with 95% confidence intervals. The average public good level is not signifi-
cantly different from the Pareto optimum (yPO = 4.8095) in 43 of the 50 periods for the
cVCG mechanism and 35 of 50 periods in both the Walker and Groves Ledyard mech-
anisms. However, the average public good level in the Walker mechanism is also not
significantly different from the highly inefficient level of y = 3.3 in 35 of 50 periods. This
is due to the high variability of observed outcomes between sessions. The average in the
cVCG mechanism is not significantly different from the Pareto optimum in 22 of the final
25 periods, whereas the same is true in only 15 of the final 25 periods for the Groves-
Ledyard mechanism. As predicted by Nash equilibrium and best response dynamics,
the Voluntary Contribution mechanism significantly underprovides and the Proportional
Tax mechanism overprovides the public good with the current parameters.
Efficiency levels follow from the results on the public goods levels. The cVCG mech-
anism is the most efficient, followed by the Groves Ledyard mechanism. Interestingly,
the average efficiency of the Walker mechanism is not significantly greater than the ef-
ficiency of the initial endowments (71.18%) in 38 of the 50 periods, and in 4 periods
the average efficiency is significantly lower. This trend does not disappear across time.
Thus, the Walker mechanism often violates the “individual rationality” constraint that
its equilibrium is guaranteed to satisfy.
The high level of efficiency achieved by the cVCG mechanism is not due convergence
to the weak dominant strategy equilibrium, but rather to various weakly dominated
Nash equilibria. Recall from Section 4.5 that all Nash equilibria of this mechanism are
necessarily outcome efficient, so that the observed behavior results in efficiencies as good
or better than that of the dominant strategy equilibrium. However, it is important
to reiterate that the efficiency of the mechanism is particularly high under the current
parameters and the results are likely to change in different environments.
6.5 Open Questions
The fundamental difficulty of testing the efficiency of mechanisms in the laboratory lies in
their sensitivity to parameter choice. Past research has focused on changing punishment
parameters of the mechanisms, but it is unknown how behavior differs when preferences
are varied within a mechanism. In particular, the role of the incentive-efficiency tradeoff
in guiding behavior is not known.
The current set of experiments makes use of the ”What-If Scenario Analyzer” tool that
enables subjects to calculate hypothetical payoffs. This tool is provided as an alternative
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to the payoff tables often provided in experiments. The effect of this tool on dynamic
behavior is not well understood. Unfortunately, the version of the software in use for
this study does not provide data about what hypothetical scenarios subjects considered.
Only actual decisions are tracked. The possibility of studying hypothetical explorations
is an exciting extension to this research that may provide additional understanding of
the learning dynamics in use.
On the theoretical front, much work is left undone with respect to dynamics in pub-
lic goods mechanisms. The literature is far behind that of private goods mechanisms,
where stability in competitive markets has been extensively analyzed for several decades.
Taesung Kim [25] shows that mechanisms Nash implementing Lindahl allocations must
be locally unstable for some environment. However, restricting attention to quasilinear
environments, a dynamically stable game form is introduced that does implement the
Lindahl correspondence. De Trenqualye [11] and Vega-Redondo [42] introduce mecha-
nisms that converge to the Lindahl allocation under Cournot best response behavior.
Some mechanisms such as Smith’s auction [37] use convergence of tatonnemont-like dy-
namics as a stopping rule in each period of the mechanism. However, there have been
only limited attempts to seriously consider dynamic issues in the theoretical mechanism
design literature.
7 Conclusion
Motivated by the conjecture that a wide variety of behavior in a number of previous
studies is consistent with a simple best response dynamic model, this paper experimen-
tally compares five different public goods mechanisms, each with interesting equilibrium
properties. In particular, dynamically stable and unstable Nash mechanisms are com-
pared along with a weak dominant strategy mechanism whose best response properties
provide an opportunity to distinguish between best response and equilibrium behavior.
This latter mechanism, though tested in simpler forms in previous experiments, has never
been tested in the laboratory with more than one preference parameter.
The results of these experiments strongly support the best response behavioral con-
jecture. Strategies converge to Nash equilibria that are asymptotic attractors in a best
response dynamic and diverge from equilibria that are not. In the weak dominant strat-
egy mechanism, behavior tends to track a rotating best response line through the strategy
space, implying that subjects who don’t understand the undominated properties of truth-
ful revelation instead seek a best response strategy, resulting in the realization of weakly
dominanted Nash equilibria. This result implies that elimination of weakly dominated
strategies is an inappropriate tool for game theoretic analysis.
Although outcomes and efficiency are sensitive to parameters, the continuous VCG
mechanism performs well in both categories, as does the Groves-Ledyard mechanism.
The Walker mechanism, due to its instability, generates efficiencies below that of the
initial endowment.
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The implications for mechanism design are straightforward. Most theorists have ig-
nored dynamic stability in considering public goods mechanisms. The significant contri-
bution of this paper is that it bridges the behavioral hypotheses that have existed sepa-
rately in dominant strategy and Nash equilibrium mechanism experiments. The finding
that a 5-period average best response dynamic is a fairly accurate behavioral model in
all of these settings implies not only that dynamic behavior should be considered in
theoretical research, but it also provides some guidance as to which behavioral models
appear to be the most accurate. The results of this paper show that a best response
dynamic with beliefs formed over a small number of previous periods well approximates
the data. Thus, Nash implementation mechanisms should satisfy dynamic stability and
dominant strategy mechanisms should satisfy the strict dominance property if either is
to be considered for real-world use in a repeated interaction setting.
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Figure 1: Two best response surfaces for Player i in the cVCG mechanism. Agent i’s true
parameter vector is θi = (ai, bi) while θ−i and θ′−i are two different parameter announce-
ments of the other players. Note that θi is a best response to either announcement as it
is a weakly dominant strategy.
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Figure 2: Average model error for the 5-period best response model and Nash equilibrium
models in the Voluntary Contribution mechanism.
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Proportional Taxation Mechanism
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Figure 3: Average model error for the 5-period best response model and Nash equilibrium
models in the Proportional Taxation mechanism.
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Groves−Ledyard Mechanism
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Figure 4: Average model error for the 5-period best response model and Nash equilibrium
models in the Groves-Ledyard mechanism.
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Walker Mechanism
5−period BR model deviations Nash equilibrium model deviations
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Figure 5: Average model error for the 5-period best response model and Nash equilibrium
models in the Walker mechanism.
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Figure 6: Simulated power of the permutation test given in Equation for various differ-
ences in model predictions as a ratio of the data’s standard deviation.
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Figure 7: p-values and estimated power for the permutation tests in the Voluntary Con-
tribution mechanism. Stars, Xs, and Os represent test results for those tests with a power
of at least 0.45. Star represents rejection of H0 at the 5% level, X represents rejection
at the 10% level, and O represents no rejection of H0. Note that this mechanism has no
test with power ≥ 45%.
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Proportional Taxation Mechanism
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Figure 8: p-values and estimated power for the permutation tests in the Proportional
Tax mechanism. Stars, Xs, and Os represent test results for those tests with a power of
at least 0.45. Star represents rejection of H0 at the 5% level, X represents rejection at
the 10% level, and O represents no rejection of H0.
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Groves−Ledyard Mechanism
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Figure 9: p-values and estimated power for the permutation tests in the Groves-Ledyard
mechanism. Stars, Xs, and Os represent test results for those tests with a power of at
least 0.45. Star represents rejection of H0 at the 5% level, X represents rejection at the
10% level, and O represents no rejection of H0.
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Walker Mechanism
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Figure 10: p-values and estimated power for the permutation tests in the Walker mech-
anism. Stars, Xs, and Os represent test results for those tests with a power of at least
0.45. Star represents rejection of H0 at the 5% level, X represents rejection at the 10%
level, and O represents no rejection of H0.
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Figure 11: Polar-coordinate representation of the cVCG data with the origin at the
truth-telling point and the horizontal axis corresponding to the 5-period best response
surface. Two different scalings of the same graph are presented.
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Figure 12: Time series of average distance from equilibrium and angular deviation from
the best response line for each player type in the cVCG mechanism with 95% confidence
intervals.
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Figure 13: Average message and 95 for players in the Voluntary Contribution mechanism
with a strict dominant strategy to contribute zero.
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Figure 14: The average level of public good and realized efficiency for each mechanism in
each period along with 95% confidence intervals. PO represents the Pareto Optimal level
of the public good (4.8095) and IR represents the efficiency of the initial endowments
(71.18%.)
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Agent ai bi ωi
Player 1 1 34 260
Player 2 8 116 140
Player 3 2 40 260
Player 4 6 68 250
Player 5 4 44 290
Table 1: Preference parameters θi = (ai, bi) and ωi used in all sessions.
First time period used in calculating average minimum deviation (tmin)
k 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 1.407 1.394 1.284 1.151 1.104 1.088 1.072 1.054 1.054 1.049
2 - 1.240 1.135 0.991 0.967 0.949 0.932 0.922 0.913 0.910
3 - - 1.097 0.963 0.940 0.925 0.904 0.888 0.883 0.875
4 - - - 0.952 0.932 0.915 0.898 0.877 0.866 0.861
5 - - - - 0.924 0.911 0.895 0.876 0.860 0.853
6 - - - - - 0.911 0.897 0.881 0.868 0.854
7 - - - - - - 0.899 0.884 0.873 0.863
8 - - - - - - - 0.884 0.874 0.864
9 - - - - - - - - 0.879 0.870
10 - - - - - - - - - 0.875
Table 2: Calculated average minimum deviation from best response for various k-period
best response models. Boldfaced entries represent, for each value of tmin, the smallest
average minimum deviation measure among the 10 models tested. Note that the measure
cannot be calculated for k ≥ tmin since k periods are used to “seed” the model.
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Session Periods Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5 Average
Session 1 All 50 0.82 0.76 0.00 0.88 0.62 0.62
Session 1 Last 10 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.80
Session 2 All 50 0.92 0.28 1.00 0.00 0.88 0.62
Session 2 Last 10 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.70 0.66
Session 3 All 50 0.40 0.04 1.00 0.48 0.70 0.52
Session 3 Last 10 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.90 0.48
Session 4 All 50 0.00 0.94 0.92 0.04 0.04 0.39
Session 4 Last 10 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.40
Average All 50 0.54 0.51 0.73 0.35 0.56 0.54
Average Last 10 0.50 0.65 0.75 0.38 0.65 0.59
Table 3: Frequency of revelation of both parameters (“full revelation”) by each player of
the cVCG mechanism for all 50 periods and for the last 10.
Session Periods Player1 Player2 Player3 Player4 Player5 Average
Session 1 All 50 0.94 0.78 0.04 0.90 0.76 0.68
Session 1 Last 10 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.80
Session 2 All 50 1.00 0.30 1.00 0.04 0.94 0.66
Session 2 Last 10 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 0.70 0.66
Session 3 All 50 0.80 0.06 1.00 0.48 0.72 0.61
Session 3 Last 10 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.90 0.68
Session 4 All 50 0.68 0.98 1.00 0.08 0.34 0.62
Session 4 Last 10 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.10 0.60 0.74
Average All 50 0.86 0.53 0.76 0.38 0.69 0.64
Average Last 10 1.00 0.65 0.75 0.40 0.80 0.72
Table 4: Frequency of revelation of either parameter (“partial revelation”) by each player
of the cVCG mechanism for all 50 periods and for the last 10.
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